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Abstract 
Access control policies in healthcare domain define permissions for users to access different medical 
records. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) helps to restrict medical records to users in a certain role but 
sensitive information in medical records can still be compromised by authorized insiders. The threat is 
from users who are not treating the patient but have access to medical records .We propose selective 
combination of policies where sensitive records are only available to primary doctor under Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC). This helps not only better compliance of principle of least privilege but also helps 
to  mitigate  the  threat  of  authorized  insiders  disclosing  sensitive  patient  information.  We  use  Policy 
Machine (PM) proposed by NIST to combine policies and develop a flexible healthcare access control 
policy which has benefits of context awareness and discretionary access. Temporal constrains have been 
added to RBAC in PM and after combination of Generalized Temporal RBAC and DAC an example 
healthcare scenario has been setup. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Healthcare data of a patient contains sensitive information which requires enforcement of confidentiality 
mechanisms  on  healthcare  records  to  protect  the  privacy  of  patients  and  to  prevent  access  from 
unauthorized persons. Example of sensitive information in health records can be details regarding fertility 
and abortion, emotional and psychiatric problems, HIV and sexually transmitted diseases, physical and 
substance abuse. Protection of medical records becomes more important in cases where disclosure of 
personal medical information may create embarrassing situation for patients or causes discrimination 
based on medical ailment [1]. It is estimated that during a typical hospital stay, about 150 people like 
doctors, nurses, X-ray technicians, and billing clerks can access patient’s medical records to perform their 
duties [2]. But in one incident, test results of a star baseball player were looked at by nearly 7000 people 
when he was under treatment at a New York City hospital for a shoulder injury [2]. In other incidents 
more than 120 workers at UCLA Medical Center looked at celebrities' medical records and other personal 
information without permission between January 2004 and June 2006 [3] and a New Jersey hospital 
suspended about 27 workers for peeking at records of actor George Clooney [4]. 
 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was enacted by the US Congress in 
1996 which contains privacy and security rules to regulate the use and disclosure of Protected Health 
Information (PHI) [5]. PHI includes health information in any form or media that can be used to identify a 
patient.  The  privacy  rule  in  HIPPA  requires  that  if  a  health  care  facility  discloses  any  PHI  after 
authorization from patient then it should disclose only the minimum necessary information required to 
achieve its purpose. 
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Medical records are now maintained in many healthcare facilities in digital form known as Electronic 
Healthcare  Records  (EHR)  or  Electronic  Medical  Records  (EMR).  Clinical  Document  Architecture 
(CDA)  prepared  by  Health  Level  Seven  (HL7)  is  an  American  National  Standards  Institute  (ANSI) 
certified standard [6]. HL7 standards are used in most of the healthcare facilities in US. CDA defines 
XML  architecture  for  clinical  documents  and  can  include  text,  sound,  images  and  videos.  A  CDA 
document has two parts, header and body. Header contains the information about patient and medical 
providers,  while  the  body  is  divided  into  sections  containing  clinical  information.  Figure  1  shows  a 
typical instance of XML CDA document. Here <ClinicalDocument> is the root element of the CDA 
schema and <structuredBody> element encapsulates the body of CDA document. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Example of a CDA Document [6] 
 
In  this  paper  we  propose  design  of  access  control  policies  to  protect  sensitive  data  of  patients  in 
healthcare domain using Policy Machine. Our contribution is to show that policies like Discretionary 
Access  Control  (DAC)  and  Role  Based  Access  Control  (RBAC)  have  limitations  for  protection  of 
sensitive data against insider threat and how better access control policies can be designed by selectively 
combining Generalized Temporal RBAC and DAC. The paper is organized as follows, in Section 2 we 
discuss the problem of insider threat in healthcare domain in terms of authorization and how it can be 
mitigated. In Section 3 different approaches for access control are introduced. We discuss and compare 
different access control mechanisms in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the healthcare application 
designed with PM. An example healthcare scenario is setup in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes the 
paper.  
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Healthcare providers are expected to ensure privacy of patient health records. Different users like doctors, 
nurses and admission clerks may be required to access patient information to perform their jobs. The 
sensitive information can still be compromised within the security policy by authorized users if they are 
over privileged and are careless or have mal intent. The threat to confidentiality of information caused by 
misuse of privileges by authorized users is known as insider threat and level of misuse has been classified 
in [7] as follows 
 
2.1 Types of Insider Threat 
 
-  Carelessness or Unintentional:  This type of insider threat occurs when users forget to logoff 
properly or by mistake open the records of some other patient. The users may be inclined to take 
short cuts like not logging off intentionally if the authentication system is cumbersome.  The 
behavior  of  users  to keep  their  login  id  and  password  at  some  convenient  place  like  around 
computer monitor, in drawers or on table in their work area can also be termed as carelessness 
and can result in compromise of their id and password. This threat becomes more profound if we 
consider the scenario where sensitive data of patients is available to all users [1, 2]. In this case 
the sensitive data of all patients is compromised even if login id and password of only one doctor 
has been stolen.  
 
-  Curiosity: It is assumed that users will access health records of patients under their care only. 
The  audit  mechanisms  are  usually  in  place  to  record  any  such  access  but  still  users  due  to 
curiosity might snoop in medical records of ex-relations, celebrities and colleagues. 
 
-  Mal Intentions: The authorized users might access personal information to harm or embarrass 
any  patient  or  to  earn  profit  by selling  the  information.  Any  employee  may  even  take  these 
actions to embarrass the healthcare facility if he is fired from the job. 
 
The misuse of authorization by insiders in examples [1, 2, 3, and 4] is due to violation of principle of least 
privilege. This principle requires that a user be given only those privileges that are necessary to perform 
the specific job. It is violated when for ease of use the users are given permissions more than their 
requirement. Use of RBAC in healthcare domain for access control does allow to restrict the permissions 
for a certain role but still these permissions can give more information than required in case of sensitive 
data which can result in disclosure of sensitive patient information. 
 
2.2 Approach to Mitigate Insider Threat 
 
It is suggested that the healthcare data be classified as normal or sensitive. Sensitive medical data should 
be the one, disclosure of which will cause embarrassment or discrimination to the patient. The patient’s 
privacy is compromised by leakage of sensitive medical information so he or she should be the one to 
make  the  decision  to  declare  the  information  as  sensitive.  If  patient  classifies  some  information  as 
sensitive  then  this  should  only  be  available  to  the  doctor  treating  the  patient.  This  doctor  will  then 
exercise control over sensitive data and may allow discretionary access to other users on need to know 
basis. 4 
 
 
The insider threats to confidentiality of information can be mitigated by using access control mechanisms 
like DAC and RBAC. But both of them if used alone have some limitations for protection against insider 
threat which can be removed by selective combination of these policies. We suggest that the access to 
sensitive medical records of patients should be restricted to primary doctors only and is shared on need to 
know basis. This can be achieved by applying DAC policy to sensitive documents and RBAC for the 
normal documents. By comparing two scenarios, one where a person in specific role can see information 
of all patients to second where normal medical records are available for all patients but sensitive records 
are available only to primary doctor we will see how the threat of misuse by insiders is mitigated. 
 
-  Carelessness or unintentional: If a session of an authorized user has not been locked or the login 
id and password has been stolen then the sensitive information of the patients under treatment 
with that specific doctor will be compromised only instead of all patients. 
-  Curiosity: The curious insider is now restricted to just the normal information of all patients and 
the sensitive information of patients authorized to him only. 
-  Mal intentions: To harm or embarrass any patient the insider will need the specific sensitive 
information which is now available to primary doctor only and is denied to others. 
 
3. Related Work and Access Control Background 
 
Access  control  mechanisms  for  healthcare  have  been  proposed  to  implement  security  and  privacy 
policies. These efforts are based on extending RBAC to formulate privacy and security policies. Rafae et 
al  have  proposed  XML  based  Generalized  Temporal  Role  Based  Access  Control  (X-GTRBAC)  for 
healthcare and have designed an example policy based on requirement use cases [8, 9]. Most of the 
schemes  proposed  for  healthcare  in  recent  literature  use  RBAC  [10].  Bandar  et  al  have  suggested 
combination  of  DAC,  RBAC  and  MAC  to  satisfy  access  control  requirements  for  Electronic  Health 
Records  [11].  The  authors  suggest  combination  of  all  three  policies  simultaneously  which  is  a  rigid 
requirement for healthcare scenario. For example sensitive data can only be given one label to have it 
available to a specific doctor under MAC. This will prevent sharing of the health records among doctors 
for tasks like consultancy. We propose  a flexible approach  where according to requirement sensitive 
records  may  be  placed  in  one  policy  or  both  the  policies.  Also  authors  suggest  that  ownership  of 
documents be with patients in DAC. We feel that although patients own the data and they should have 
access to all their records but ownership under DAC policy when applicable should be with the primary 
doctor who should be able to share it after getting permission from patient. 
 
Hippocratic databases have been developed for protection of personal information. The basic theme is 
that data collection and disclosure should be associated with purpose specification and user consent. The 
authors propose Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) or the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language 
(EPAL) for policy specification.  The  Hippocratic databases are designed to enforce better disclosure 
policies so that patient preference is taken into account while sharing health information with research 
organizations,  pharmaceutical  companies  or  government  agencies.  The  database  also  has  an  audit 
mechanism  to  find  security  breaches  but  in  case  of  insider  threat  the  goal  should  be  to  protect  the 
information in first place instead of finding the culprit after the damage has been done [12, 13, and 14]. 
The exception based mechanisms are part of healthcare to allow access in case of emergency but it was 5 
 
observed in [15] that the use was too frequent to detect any misuse. Most of the exceptions have been in 
case of referrals and second opinions which should have been allowed by access control policy without 
having to use exception mechanisms. Rafae et al have proposed policy refinement for better privacy 
coverage against exception based access in a typical healthcare setup [16]. The policy refinement is based 
on  feedback  from  audit  logs  and  system  still needs  to  differentiate  between  violations  and  rules  for 
refinement. In our scheme the sensitive information is available to primary doctors only and they can 
further share medical information for referral or second opinion without using exception mechanisms. 
The  sensitive  information  in  this  case  must  have  stronger  requirements  for  access  and  audit  under 
exception mechanisms than normal information.  
 
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a policy specification language prepared by 
OASIS which allows access control policy formulation in XML. Policies are specified as set of rules and 
are created at Policy Administration Point (PAP). XACML also defines algorithms for combination of 
rules  and  policies  to  have  deny-override,  permit-override,  first-applicable  and  only-one-applicable 
decisions. Access to resources is controlled by Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). When a user requests 
access  to  information  PEP  sends  request  to  Policy  Decision  Point  (PDP).  The  PDP  then  checks  all 
applicable policies and determines whether permission should be granted. The response is then sent by 
PDP for enforcement to PEP which allows or denies access. Obligations are the operations specified in 
policy which must be performed by PEP along with authorization decision [17]. XACML profile of core 
and hierarchical RBAC have been developed but it still lacks separation of duty constraints of RBAC 
[18]. Temporal constraints like access from 9 AM to 5 PM interval or for duration of five hours can be 
specified in XACML [19] but it is not as expressive as temporal constraints in GTRBAC which allows 
specifying periodic constraints and also allows constraints for days of the week like 9 AM to 5 PM for 
Monday to Friday only. 
 
3.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
 
DAC  is  an  access  control  mechanism  that  allows  users  to  own  objects  or  files  and  they  can  give 
permission to other users for objects under their control [20]. A strict DAC policy requires that owner is 
the only one who can grant access to an object and ownership cannot be transferred. A liberal DAC policy 
assumes that ownership can be transferred to other users based on single level grant or multi level grant 
[21]. DAC allows defining permissions for individual users on specific medical records. But the problem 
with DAC arises as the number of records and users grow, the updating of permissions is not scalable. 
 
3.2 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) has emerged as a standard for specifying permissions for a large 
group of users. It allows defining roles similar to the functional responsibilities of users in an organization 
and then giving permissions to roles [22]. RBAC policy consists of user, roles the user can assume and 
permissions available to each role. If a user assumes a role he gets all the permissions associated with that 
role. 
 
Using contextual constraints like time and locations in RBAC we can restrict access to sensitive data of 
patients  to  users  only  during  the  authorized  time  and  place.  Generalized  Temporal  RBAC  defines 6 
 
temporal constraints for RBAC using periodicity and duration constraints. The periodicity constraints can 
be used to specify the exact intervals for a role enabling and role assignment or permission assignment. 
While the duration constraints allow specifying durations for which enabling or assignment of a role and 
permission assignment is valid [23]. GTRBAC allows defining roles like night nurse or day physician 
which helps to ensure that the users have access to sensitive data only during the time shift they are 
working.  
 
3.3 Policy Machine (PM) 
 
Policy Machine (PM), developed by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), provides the 
ability  to  configure  and  enforce  arbitrary  attribute-based  access  control  policies  [24].  It  can  enforce 
policies  such  as  RBAC,  DAC,  Mandatory  Access  Control  (MAC)  and  also  combination  of  multiple 
policies. It helps to protect objects under one or more policy instances while enforcing these policies 
through a series of fixed PM functions that are invoked in response to user or subject access requests. 
User attribute (UA) is defined as mapping of user (U) to defined set of capabilities and U UA is an 
assignment relation which means that user U has the properties denoted by attribute UA. Capabilities of a 
UA  are  derived  from  assignment  of  user  attribute  to  operation  set,  where  operation  set  is  a  set  of 
operations. PM allows enforcement of multiple policies so that an object under two or more policies can 
only be accessed by a user if he can meet access control requirements for all applicable policies.  
 
PM is a generalized access control mechanism and there can be different choices for its architecture and 
implementation. Reference implementation of PM is a three layer application consisting of Presentation 
layer, Application Logic layer and Data layer. The data layer uses MS Active Directory (AD) as a data 
repository  and  Lightweight  Directory  Access  Protocol  (LDAP)  server  as  access  mechanism.  The 
application logic layer contains Policy Server which manages all data and relations stored in AD. The 
policy server provides services to admin client and session simulator. The admin client, session simulator, 
session manager, user sessions and user applications are part of presentation layer [21]. The policy to be 
implemented is specified in *.pm file which is loaded into AD by admin client. The admin client reads the 
policy specifications and sends them to policy server as commands. The policy server after parsing the 
commands  loads  permissions  in  appropriate  containers  of  AD.  The  Virtual  Object  System  (VOS) 
computation allows finding the objects accessible to a user attribute. During subject attribute activation 
the attributes are activated for users according to the capability. Finally reference mediation function 
grants permission if available.  
 
4. Need for Multiple Policies against Insider Threat 
 
Healthcare  data  contains  information  about  patients  ranging  from  regular  hospital  visits  to  sensitive 
information which the patient will like to keep as private as possible. The hospital information systems 
should have authorization mechanisms in place so that sensitive data of the patients is only available to 
primary doctor. A simple hypothetical scenario is considered to compare issues with different access 
control mechanisms for implementation of this requirement, where Alice and Bob are two doctors and A, 
B, C and D are four patients. All patients have declared some data as sensitive which should be available 
to the patient and primary doctor only. The primary doctor for A and B is Alice while for C and D it is 
Bob. Both Alice and Bob should be able to see the normal medical records for all patients and the patient 7 
 
can see all his medical records. The primary doctor may seek consultation on some sensitive record from 
other doctor. Now it is discussed how DAC and RBAC can be used to satisfy this requirement and what 
are the issues and how combination of policies can help to resolve these issues? 
 
The use of DAC policy as authorization mechanism will require that both Alice and Bob are given access 
to all normal medical records of patients and for sensitive records only the primary doctor is given access 
as shown in Figure 2(a). But this scheme requires constant updating of access control lists as new CDA 
documents are created or new patients are added. The approach is not be scalable if we consider a large 
volume of CDA notes (50,000/week for Mayo clinic [6]) and the need to update access control lists of all 
doctors, support and admin staff. 
 
   
Figure 2. Comparison of Policies (a) DAC (b) RBAC (c) Sen in RBAC and DAC (d) Sen in DAC 
 
RBAC allows to group users under one role and if the permissions are updated for a group these are valid 
for all users in that role. Using RBAC both Alice and Bob can take role Doctor and can access normal 
documents for all patients as shown in Figure 2(b). Each patient will need a unique role to access his own 
medical records (Role dpatA for accessing sensitive records of patient A). The sensitive information for a 
patient is also available under the same role and the primary doctor can access sensitive documents using 
this  role.  But  still  there  are  issues  with  consultation  as  this  role  cannot  be  shared  with  Bob.  For 
consultation the primary doctor may need opinion on a single clinical document only but giving the role 
dpatA to consultant will give permission for all sensitive documents of patient A. 
 
This problem can be solved by adding more roles to have unique roles for each doctor using which the 
sensitive  information  is  made  available  to  Alice  and  Bob  for  their  own  patients  (Role  senAlice  for 
accessing sensitive records of Alice’s patients). But still in case of consultation the doctor cannot share 
the roles. Another approach can be for example if Alice needs to consult Bob on some clinical note of 
patient A, she may ask the administrator to assign permission for that document to sensitive role of Bob 
as  she  under  RBAC  doesn’t  have  the  privilege  for  permission  assignment.  Here  having  sensitive 8 
 
information under DAC offers the benefit that patient or primary doctor owns the documents and can 
share them for second opinion or consultation. 
 
Policy Machine is an attribute based access control mechanism which allows enforcement of multiple 
policies to give security policies which are scalable, context aware and allow discretionary access. PM 
allows  flexibility  in  composing  policies  for  healthcare  and  we  can  meet  the  requirements  of  having 
restricted access to sensitive records and usability by combining both DAC and RBAC in PM as shown in 
Figure 2(c) and 2(d). The policies can be defined such that the sensitive documents are in multiple polices 
as shown in Figure 2(c) in which user has to satisfy access requirements for both policies. This scenario 
corresponds  to  Figure  3(a)  and  the  combination  of  policies  allows  us  to  use  temporal  features  of 
GTRBAC and selective permissions of DAC.  The  medical records of  all patients including sensitive 
records are available in RBAC to different roles. The sensitive records for a specific patient are assigned 
in DAC policy to the primary doctor. Now during reference mediation PM allows access to only those 
records for which users have permission in all applicable policies. A person can access sensitive medical 
record only if he has permission in both DAC and RBAC policy. The primary doctor can give access on a 
specific record for consultation and only this record will be available under DAC policy to the other 
doctor. Alice under PM has attribute doctor in RBAC by which she can access all records of all patients 
and attribute Alicia in DAC by which she can access sensitive records of A and B but she cannot access 
sensitive records of C and D for which she doesn’t have permission in DAC.  This combination gives the 
benefit that if a user cannot take a role in RBAC then even if he has discretionary access for a sensitive 
record the permission to access the records will be denied. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Permission set (a) Sen in RBAC and DAC (b) Sen in DAC 
 
The combination by assigning sensitive records to both policies will cause limitations in some cases. For 
example we may need to use PM as in 2(d) when some sensitive information has to be shared with some 
other facility users of which are not part of any role in RBAC. Now having the sensitive information just 
under DAC allows use in internal facility as well as sharing of information with the external facility. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that as RBAC and DAC are mutually exclusive and the context aware 
features of RBAC cannot be combined with DAC as shown in Figure 3(b). 
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5. Security Policy for Healthcare 
 
The basic design of access control for healthcare based on PM is shown in Figure 4. Here access of users 
to healthcare records is controlled by PM. Different types of clinical data may have different security 
policies and multiple policies can be enforced on a single document according to the requirement. A user 
request to access any Clinical Document (CD) is evaluated by PM by checking the status of user under a 
policy and available permissions to CD’s are displayed to user. Principle of least privilege is implemented 
by restricting the permission set for roles by moving sensitive information under DAC policy where it is 
only available on “need to know” basis. The doctor treating the patient has access under DAC policy and 
the doctor might give access to a consultant on a specific document for opinion.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Multimedia Objects in a Clinical Document 
 
A clinical document may contain images, videos or audio notes as shown in Figure 4. The multimedia 
objects which are part of a clinical document may have different permissions. For example a doctor may 
be able to see the radiology note under RBAC but not the X-ray image (if declared sensitive) which under 
DAC policy is only available to the surgeon treating the patient. The radiology note is displayed to the 
doctor without X-ray image and to the surgeon with image. 
 
The PM architecture has been extended to add temporal context to RBAC so that time sensitive policies 
can also be enforced and an application for healthcare has also been added. The new architecture for 
healthcare is shown in Figure 5. All the clinical documents and their related multimedia content are stored 
in policy server. The user is logged in to session manager after authentication. The session simulator 
communicates with policy server and after VOS computation and subject attribute activation the relevant 
objects are displayed to user under applicable policies. The objects visible to a user in user-session can be 
accessed using CDA application developed for PM. The health records based on CDA are in XML format 
and the CDA application is launched whenever an XML object is accessed. The application reads the 
XML object and displays the clinical data and the associated multimedia content to user. The multimedia 10 
 
content is only displayed by CDA application if the user has permission to access them under some 
policy. CDA application currently developed and tested with PM is still a proof of concept and can 
display images and text in clinical documents. In future the functionality to play video and audio will also 
be added to the application. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  PM Architecture for Healthcare Application 
 
 
6. Example Policy 
 
An example policy is shown in Figure 6. The layout of policy is based on following rules. 
 
-  Any person in role doctor can see normal medical records of all patients but sensitive records 
are available for access to the doctor for his own patients only 
-  The role doctor may be active only during working days (Mon-Fri) from 9 am to 5 pm 
-  All patients can access their own medical records 
-  A doctor may allow access to a colleague to have consultation on some record for his own 
patients only 11 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Example EHR policy on PM 
 
The healthcare policy allows any person in role doctor to see normal medical records using GTRBAC but 
sensitive records are available for access to the doctor for his own patients only under DAC. The doctor 
may allow discretionary access to a colleague to have consultation on some record. We can see that Alice 
has access to sensitive objects under DAC policy and she can access all records of Katie under GTRBAC. 
But Bob has no access to sensitive records under DAC so he can only view normal records of Katie in 
role doctor. History note is controlled by two policies and Alice can only access it if she is active in role 
doctor in GTRBAC and with attribute Alicia in DAC. If for example the role doctor is not available to 
Alice after 5 pm then she will not able to access history note after 5 pm. Here although she has access 
under DAC policy but the permission is denied under GTRBAC policy after 5pm. In order to access an 
object under multiple policies, a user has to have permission for all applicable policies.  
 
7. Conclusion 
RBAC has been used for access control management for electronic health records. But a more stringent 
set of access control is required to prevent snooping and malicious use of sensitive data by users under a 
specific role. Access control for healthcare under PM allows assigning appropriate permissions under 
multiple policies like GTRBAC and DAC to control access to sensitive information. Users have to satisfy 
requirement of both policies which ensures that sensitive data is available only on need to know basis. 
Our contribution in this paper is to show that insider threat for healthcare can be mitigated by using access 
control mechanisms like DAC or RBAC but it comes with its own issues like scalability in DAC and the 
need to create multiple roles in RBAC. The policy machine can be used to solve both issues by using 
GTRBAC for normal records and DAC for sensitive records allowing benefits of both. 
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